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ACCESS GRANTED: THE WINKELMAN CASE USHERS 
IN A NEW ERA IN PARENTAL ADVOCACY 
Laura McNeal* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the U.S. Department of Education, nearly 6.8 
million children currently receive special education services in 
secondary schools. 1 Historically, our nation's response to 
students with disabilities was segregation from the general 
classroom, exclusion, and institutionalization.2 However, 
groundbreaking legislation, such as the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act, opened our nation's schools to 
students with special needs, and also served as the catalyst for 
a major culture shift toward a higher quality education for 
students with disabilities. This trend toward increasing the 
quality of special education continued with the enactment of 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)3, 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act4 , the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA)5, and the No Child Left Behind Act6. 
Collectively, these laws form the legal landscape for special 
education in America's schools. 
*Assistant Professor of Urban Education, Department of Teacher Education, Michigan 
State University. 
1. United States Department of Education, 
http://www.ed.gov/about/officesllist/osers/osep/index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). 
2. LARRY D. BARTLETT, SUSAN ETSCHEIDT & GREG R. WEISENSTEIN, SPECIAL 
EDUCATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5-8 (2d ed. 2007). 
3. Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S. C. § 1400 (2006). 
4. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S. C. § 794(a) (2006). 
5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S. C.§§ 12,101-12,213 (1988 & Supp. II 1988). Many of the Act's 
key provisions are drawn from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i 
(1988 & Supp. II 1988), which provided limited employment protection for 
"handicapped" employees of the federal government, federal contractors, and recipients 
of federal aid. 
6. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-7941. 
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In recent years, there has been an increased interest in 
promoting educational equity within America's schools. 
Researchers, educators, and policymakers have struggled to 
find solutions to the nation's achievement gap and provide all 
students with a high quality education. As a result, there has 
been an increased focus on improving the quality of education 
for students with disabilities. This is evidenced by the 
enhanced accountability measures embedded within federal 
education mandates (such as the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act). The primary purpose of these mandates is to 
promote substantive-as opposed to symbolic-special 
education reform in America's K-12 schools. 
The parents of speciaJ needs children have also taken an 
active role in ensuring that their child receives a quality 
education. Current special education laws provide parents with 
legally-enforceable rights regarding their child's education. 
Although parents may contribute to a dialogue regarding their 
child's education, such as the development of an Individualized 
Education Plan (IEP), school officials make the final decisions 
as to the degree and scope of special education services; this is 
due to the fact that parents' legal rights are procedural-as 
opposed to substantive-in nature. Thus, although parents are 
permitted to actively participate in their child's education 
process, the law does not require parental consent with respect 
to the contents of the final IEP. 
Although, the area of special education law concerning 
parental legal rights is relatively clear, certain important 
aspects of it are not. Specifically, there has been uncertainty 
whether non-lawyer parents have the right in court 
proceedings to challenge pro se the suitability of their child's 
special education services. The ambiguities of this topic are 
highlighted by the immense variability in circuit courts 
decisions throughout the country. Recently, the Supreme Court 
resolved this unsettled area of law in Winhelman u. Parma 
School District. 
According to Fisher, "Laws serve two functions: (1) symbolic 
and (2) substantive. The symbolic function of law includes such 
goals as reaffirming cherished values and showing that 
'something is being done' about a perceived social problem."7 
7. Bonnie S. Fisher, Jennifer L. Hartman, Francis T. Cullen & Michael G. 
Turner, Making Campuses Safer for Students: The Clery Act as Symbolic Legal Reform, 
32 STETSON L. REV. 61 (2002). 
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Symbolic legislation is designed to satisfy those who advocated 
for the cause, regardless of its effectiveness in addressing the 
problem. On the other hand, the substantive function of law is 
designed to promote changes that have practical utility: 
changes that directly help solve the issue the law was created 
to address. 8 Thus, in applying this principle to the Winkelman 
v. Parma City School District decision and the current special 
education milieu, the question emerges: will the Winkelman 
decision make a symbolic or substantive impact on special 
education? 
This article explores the Winkelman decision and its 
implications on public schools, teachers, and parents of 
children with disabilities. Part II provides a brief history of 
IDEA and describes its statutory framework as it relates to the 
substantive and procedural rights of parents. Part III provides 
an overview of the legal milieu pertaining to the rights of non-
lawyer parents to proceed pro se in court proceedings 
challenging whether their child with a disability is receiving a 
free appropriate public education as mandated by IDEA. Part 
IV analyzes the Winkelman decision and asserts that it will 
have a substantive, as opposed to symbolic impact on the 
quality of special education in public schools. Additionally, I 
assert that the Winkelman decision will help transform IDEA 
into a more robust education reform through increased teacher 
and school leader accountability for the quality of education 
provided to children with disabilities. Finally, Part V explores 
the implications of Winkelman on K-12 schools and the parents 
of children with disabilities. Specifically, this section argues 
that the Winkelman decision is likely to provide more parents 
of students with disabilities a forum to advocate for their 
child's education, regardless of their socioeconomic status. 
II. IDEA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") is 
a federal statute that requires any school receiving federal 
funding to provide disabled students a free appropriate public 
education.9 IDEA has become the single most important legal 
tool in ensuring that children with mental, physical, emotional, 
8. ld. 
9. Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
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or behavioral disabilities have access to a beneficial education. 
Originally passed by Congress as "The Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act," IDEA was adopted at a time when 
the educational needs of many disabled children were either 
severely underserved or ignored all together. 10 In the early 
1970's, as many as one million disabled children were not being 
provided any education at all. 11 The impetus behind the 
passage of IDEA was two federal district court cases from the 
early seventies. 12 According to these cases, Equal Protection 
commands that States which provided free education for the 
general student population needed to extend that same benefit 
to disabled students. 13 These courts went on to hold that Due 
Process requires a hearing before educational benefits can be 
withheld from a disabled student. 14 Prior to these two 
landmark decisions, some state laws, such as those in 
Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia, allowed public 
schools to deny admission to children with an I.Q. below 
seventy until they reached the age of eight. 15 It was with this 
legal backdrop that Congress created the various provisions of 
IDEA focusing on procedural safeguards and increased 
protection for children with special education needs. 
IDEA guarantees procedural safeguards for students with 
disabilities and their parents in all areas relating to 
identification, evaluation, and placement. 16 At one time, it was 
common practice to evaluate students and make changes in 
their educational program without their parents' knowledge or 
consent. 17 IDEA elevates the status of parents to that of 
important participants in the planning and execution of their 
child's educational program. IDEA provides that parents must 
be notified and give their consent before their child is assessed 
and before the educational program is changed. Specific 
10. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 2. 
11. Id. 
12. Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Bd. of Ed., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D. D.C. 1972). 
13. Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. 279; Mills, 348 F. 
Supp. at 875. 
14. /d. 
15. Suzanne Solomon, The Intersection of 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 6 (2008). 
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). 
17. LAURA R. MCNEAL & COLLEEN M. O'ROURKE, SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR 
TEACHERS 31-62 (5th ed. 2009). 
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procedures are established in the Act, which must be followed 
from evaluation through placement and programming in order 
to protect the rights of students and their parents. 
The Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") is the most 
significant right afforded to disabled students and their 
parents by IDEA. 18 IDEA guarantees disabled students the 
substantive right to a free appropriate public education. 19 To 
this end, the statute requires that, once a child is found 
through an evaluation to be disabled, the school must prepare 
an IEP for that child. 20 The IEP is meant to bring together the 
school administration, parents, the student, and other helpful 
parties in order to create an educational plan custom-tailored 
to address the particular needs of the student.21 The written 
IEP must include, among other things, a statement of 
measurable education goals and how those goals are to be met 
in the classroom.22 The required members of the IEP team are 
spelled out. In addition to school personnel, it includes the 
child's parents, along with any person whom the parents 
believe would be of assistance.23 Further, parents must receive 
extensive notifications of any change or refusal to change their 
child's IEP. 24 Parents are also explicitly given several 
procedural safeguards during the IEP process-all at the 
school's expense-including the right to participate at any 
stage, examine documents relating to the IEP process, obtain 
an independent evaluation of their child, and mediation.25 
Finally, parents are afforded the option to enroll their child in 
private school and seek reimbursement from the school district 
if the parents prove that the school district failed to provide 
their child with a free appropriate public education. 26 
If the IEP is determined to be unsatisfactory, IDEA gives 
parents the specific right to challenge the appropriateness of 
the IEP in addressing their child's specific needs and any 
diagnostic findings upon which the plan is based. The parents' 
first option is to dispute the IEP through administrative 
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1414. 
19. Id. § 1414(d). 
20. Id. § 1414(a) & (d). 
21. McNEAL & O'ROURKE, supra note 17. 
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). 
23. Id. § 1414(d)(l)(B). 
24. ld. § 1415(b) & (c). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. § 1412(a)(lO)(C)(ii). 
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proceedings. For example, the parents may demand a Due 
Process Hearing before an impartial hearing officer to decide 
both the sufficiency of the IEP and whether the school followed 
all of the procedural processes.27 If the parents are still 
unsatisfied after the administrative level review, then they can 
bring a suit for judicial review in Federal District Court.2g 
Courts reviewing the administrative decisions are empowered 
to receive new evidence and make a decision based, first, on 
whether "the State has complied with the procedures set forth 
in the Act and, second, whether the IEP is reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits."29 
Only if both of these prongs are met is the state deemed to 
have provided a free appropriate public education.30 Parents 
who are able to succeed on the merits when challenging the 
appropriateness of their child's IEP may be entitled to 
attorneys' fees. 31 However, until recently it was unclear 
whether a disabled student's parents had an independent 
substantive right to proceed pro se in a judicial review of the 
administrative hearings. Federal circuit courts throughout the 
country interpreted this aspect of IDEA differently. The United 
States Supreme Court resolved this legal issue in Winkelman v. 
Parma City School Districts. 32 
III. LEGAL MILIEU 
A. A Split in the Circuits 
All but one of the Federal Circuits held that non-lawyer 
parents pursuing solely substantive claims were not allowed to 
represent their children without the assistance of an attorney, 
based on their legislative interpretation of IDEA. 33 The 
outlying decision, the First Circuit in Maroni v. Pemi-Baker 
27. !d. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii). 
28. !d. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
29. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. 
30. !d. 
31. 20 U.S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 
32. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). 
33. Maroni v. Pemi-baker Reg'! Sch. Dist.. 346 F.:3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003) (allowed 
parental prose representation); Collinsgru v. Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005); Mosely v. Bd. of 
Educ., 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006); Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123 
(2d Cir. 1998). 
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Reg'l School District, held that IDEA endowed parents with the 
right to represent their child in both administrative and 
judicial proceedings without the assistance of legal counsel.34 
The First Circuit reasoned that parents were "parties 
aggrieved" within the meaning of the IDEA and, thus, could 
sue a school district pro se regardless of whether the rights 
asserted were procedural or substantive. However, the vast 
majority of federal circuits had a very different interpretation 
of IDEA. This position was well represented in the Third 
Circuit's opmwn in Collinsgru v. Palmyra Board of 
Education.35 This court reasoned that appearing pro se is 
explicitly provided for in IDEA, but only when a party is 
pursuing their own rights. 36 Furthermore, the Third Circuit 
commented that it is settled common law that non-lawyer 
parents are not allowed to represent their children pro se if the 
rights asserted are the child's alone.37 Proceeding from this 
basis, the court went on to note that parents may represent 
their children under IDEA only if pursuing the parent's own 
statutory rights or if Congress had intended for IDEA to allow 
for parents, without counsel, to represent their children. The 
Third Circuit held that, based on the relevant legal landscape, 
there was no evidence that Congress ever intended to allow 
parents the option to represent their children in judicial 
proceedings. 3 ~ 
This second allowance was based on the assumption that 
Congress is aware of the existing laws and inherent limitations 
at the time it passes legislation.39 Therefore, since Congress 
knew that parents were not allowed to appear pro se for their 
children under the existing legal landscape, they would have 
explicitly designated in the statute that parents have this right 
if it was their intent. The court further reasoned that the 
plaintiffs in Collinsgru were unable to show any intent on the 
part of Congress to grant them the right of pro se 
representation and that such a showing was required to change 
the current legal regime.40 The court went on to use a canon of 
34. Maroni, 346 F.3d 247. 
35. Collinsgru, lfil F.3d 225. 
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (200fi). 
37. Osie-Afriyie v. Med. Coli. of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991). 
38. Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231. 
39. !d. at 232. 
40. !d. 
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statutory construction, namely expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, to hold that Congress never intended to allow parental 
representation in judicial review. 41 The court further reasoned 
that because Congress provided for parental representation in 
administrative proceedings, but failed to do the same in federal 
judicial proceedings, they clearly intended to limit parental pro 
se representation to the administrative phase.42 Once the Third 
Circuit had disposed of the argument that Congress intended 
to allow parents to represent their children in IDEA cases, the 
only remaining issue was whether parents personally had any 
justiciable rights. 
In this particular case, the Third Circuit held that the 
parents had not alleged that any rights particular to the 
parents had been abridged, which would allow the parents to 
proceed pro se. 43 There are two possible rights that the parents 
could have alleged. The first is whether parents have a right to 
an education for their children, since parents do have a Due 
Process right to make decisions regarding their children's 
education.44 The Court quickly rejected this argument and 
proclaimed that "IDEA itself must be the source of any such 
right[,]" whether by giving the parents enforceable rights of 
their own or by granting the parents joint rights with their 
child.45 It was undisputed that parents could claim that their 
procedural rights, such as ability to participate in the IEP 
process, had been abridged and that would provide standing to 
proceed on their own rights. However, in this case, where the 
procedural process had been followed correctly, the parents 
could not rely on the substantive claim that the student had 
been denied a free appropriate public education.46 
After discussing the statutory language and legislative 
history of IDEA, the Third Circuit determined that it was 
unclear whether Congress intended to give joint rights to 
parents. Additionally, the court ruled that it would refuse to 
grant joint rights without clear implication from Congress.47 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 233. 
44. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925). 
45. Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 233. 
46. ld. at 234. 
47. Id. at 235. 
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After Collinsgru, the Third Circuit joined a nearly unanimous 
federal judiciary in holding that non-lawyer parents could not 
prosecute IDEA claims on behalf of their children prose. 
As noted previously, the only federal court circuit that did 
allow pro se parental representation for substantive violations 
of IDEA was the First Circuit.48 The First Circuit "conclude[d] 
that parents are parties aggrieved within the meaning of 
IDEA, and thus may sue pro se."49 The court based this 
conclusion primarily on the statutory language of IDEA and 
basic precepts of administrative law. By including parents as 
parties aggrieved in administrative hearings, the court 
reasoned that Congress, likewise, intended parents be included 
as parties aggrieved for judicial review. 50 The court quickly 
established the parents' standing by pointing out that review of 
administrative decisions is not generally governed by whether 
the right is procedural or substantive, but rather whether the 
challenging party has constitutional standing.51 Further, the 
court explained that Congress obviously understood that 
"IDEA ... relies upon the central role played by parents in 
assuring that their child receives a free appropriate public 
education," and that allowing parents to represent their 
children pro se for all claims was necessary to foster that goal. 
Concomitantly, both the First and Third Circuit Courts 
solidified the need for judicial clarity on this issue. It was 
evident that the circuits were intractably split. 
B. Split Resolved: Winkelman v. Parma City School District 
Recognizing the division among the various circuit court 
decisions regarding parental pro se representation for 
substantive IDEA claims, the United States Supreme Court 
resolved this unsettled area of law in its review of Winkelman 
v. Parma City School District. 52 The Winkelman's were the 
parents of a six-year-old child with autism named Jacob, who 
was a student of the Parma City School District.53 Prior to the 
2003-2004 school year, the Winkelman's and the school district, 
48. Maroni, 346 F.3d 247. 
49. !d. at 250. 
50. !d. at 252. 
51. !d. at 25.'3. 
52. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 522 (2007). 
53. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 411 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724-25 (N.D. Ohio 
2005). 
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as required under IDEA, worked together to create an IEP for 
Jacob. 54 The Winkelmans opposed the IEP created for Jacob 
because it failed to provide him with enough music and speech 
therapy and one-on-one interaction. The Winkelman's 
preferred that Jacob be placed in a private school that 
specialized in educating autistic children, at the school 
district's expense, in lieu of attending a special education 
classroom in a public school. Dissatisfied with the contents of 
the proposed IEP, the Winkelman's placed Jacob in private 
school at their own expense and pursued administrative review 
of their son's IEP.55 
After both the initial hearing officer and a state-level 
review officer rejected their challenge to the quality and 
appropriateness of Jacob's IEP, the Winkelman's sought review 
of the decision in federal district court. 56 In their complaint, the 
Winkelman's insisted that Jacob's IEP did not provide him 
with a free appropriate public education as required by IDEA. 57 
The district court found that Jacob had been provided with a 
free appropriate public education as required by IDEA.5R 
Representing their son pro se, the Winkelman's appealed the 
district court's decision; however, the Sixth Circuit dismissed 
the case because the Winkelman's had not retained a licensed 
attorney to represent their son. The court relied on its prior 
decision in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District, 59 
which held that IDEA only intended for parents to represent 
their children during the administrative stage of the dispute-
not in judicial proceedings. The parents sought certiorari60 and 
the United States Supreme Court granted it; finally, the stage 
was set for a resolution of this issue. 
The petitioners, the Winkelmans, argued before the 
Supreme Court, that they should be allowed to proceed past the 
administrative review stage without the services of a lawyer.61 
The petitioners asserted that a comprehensive reading of IDEA 
showed that Congress clearly intended to give parents 
54. ld. at 725. 
55. ld. 
56. Id. at 725-26. 
57. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 520-21. 
58. ld. at 521. 
59. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2005). 
60. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 522. 
61. ld. at 522. 
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independent enforceable rights and make them an interested 
party. 62 Conversely, the school district contended that IDEA 
"accords parents nothing more than 'collateral tools related to 
the child's underlying substantive rights-not freestanding or 
independently enforceable rights."'63 Alternatively, the school 
district argued that, even if parents have independent rights, 
spending clause legislation requires that the statute provide 
clear notice that parents may represent themselves, which 
IDEA failed to do.64 With a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court 
announced its decision.65 
IV. ANALYSIS OF WINKELMAN V. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
In Winkelman u. Parma City School District, the United 
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of giving non-lawyer 
parents the right to proceed pro se in court proceedings 
regarding whether their disabled children are receiving a free 
appropriate public education under IDEA.66 Justice Kennedy 
explains the Court's rationale by outlining the parts of IDEA 
that were particularly relevant to the Winkelman's claim: 
"procedures to be followed when developing a child's IEP; 
criteria governing the sufficiency of an education provided to a 
child; mechanisms for review that must be made available 
when there are objections to the IEP; and the requirements in 
certain circumstances that States reimburse parents for 
various expenses."67 By examining various provisions of the 
statute bearing parental involvement, the Court explains that 
IDEA provides parents with their own substantive rights.68 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, highlights the 
parts of IDEA that guide the process of creating and 
challenging an IEP and the inclusion of parental involvement 
in that process.69 These provisions require that parents be 
provided with certain information, involved in developing an 
IEP, and included in the decision-making process.7° The 
62. !d. 
63. Id. at 527-28 (citation omitted). 
64. ld. at 533-34. 
65. ld. at 518. 
66. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 5:33. 
67. ld. at 523. 
68. ld. at 523-26. 
69. ld. at 523-24. 
70. ld. at 524. 
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parental right to involvement in the IEP process is intended to 
ensure that children are provided with a suitable education. 71 
Furthermore, "the instruction must, in addition, be provided at 
no cost to parents."72 The Court's review of this issue continues 
with a meticulous examination of provisions allowing parents 
dissatisfied with the IEP to seek administrative review and the 
legislative purpose of those hearings guaranteed to parents by 
IDEA. 
IDEA also provides rights with respect to litigation and 
review. IDEA explicitly provides that parents will be 
participating parties during the administrative hearings.73 The 
cost-recovery portion of IDEA provides a venue for parents to 
be reimbursed by their child's school district for the cost of 
private school enrollment and attorney's fees if the parent is a 
prevailing party_74 The Court holds that these provisions 
clearly show that "[p]arents enjoy enforceable rights at the 
administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the 
statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these 
rights in federal court."75 
The Court disposes of the argument that these provisions 
merely give parents a procedural right, not the freestanding 
right to challenge whether the student has been provided a free 
appropriate public education.76 The purpose of IDEA is "to 
ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents 
of such children are protected."77 Then the Court showcases 
past precedent for the proposition that "parents have a 
recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of 
their child."78 
Acknowledging the current legal landscape, the Court finds 
it highly likely that Congress intended the same right to accrue 
to parents under IDEA. 79 The statute explicitly states that 
parents will be participating parties during the administrative 
71. !d. at 523. 
72. !d. at 525 (quoting Individuals with Disabilities Education Act § 1401(29)) 
(emphasis added). 
73. !d. at 525. 
7 4. !d. at 526. 
75. !d. at 528. 
76. !d. 
77. !d. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B)). 
78. !d. at 529. 
79. !d. 
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hearings~w and also that any party aggrieved by the 
administrative decision has a right to bring action in federal 
court. 81 The majority reasons that "party aggrieved" must 
include the parents since they had participated in the 
administrative hearing. x2 It would be incongruous to make 
some of the parents' rights, such as tuition reimbursement and 
attorney's fees, contingent on a successful outcome, and yet not 
allow the parents to litigate the central issue and achieve that 
necessary successful outcome.83 These procedural rights are 
"intertwined with the substantive adequacy of the education 
provided to the child," and the difficulty in deciding which 
provision gives rights to parents or a child would be a confusing 
judicial practice.84 These procedural mechanisms were given to 
parents so that they may properly defend their own 
substantive right to ensure that their child receives a free 
appropriate public education.85 The majority finishes by 
arguing that principles of equity and justice demand that 
parents possess the substantive right to proceed without a 
lawyer; otherwise, only those families that could afford to 
retain counsel could challenge their disabled children's 
education despite the obvious congressional intent to the 
contrary, evidenced by the provision of attorney's fees in the 
statute.86 
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, uses his usual plain 
textual style to rebuke the majority for reading substantive 
parental rights into the statute. The dissent reasoned that 
parents do not have a right for their child to receive a free 
appropriate public education, and thus cannot proceed pro se 
on that claim.87 The dissent agrees that parents do have a 
procedural right to represent themselves in federal court, but 
when the claim is concerned only with the adequacy of the free 
appropriate public education, the right remains only with the 
child.88 Therefore, parents may not represent themselves. 
80. Id. at 525, 530. 
81. /d. at 531. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 530-31. 
84. /d. at 531-32. 
85. Id. at 532-3:~. 
86. /d. 
87. Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88. Id. 
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The dissent further supports their argument by 
highlighting that the parts of the statute discussing a free 
appropriate public education only name the child as the 
beneficiary.89 Unlike the majority, the dissent does not believe 
that a parent's rights are synonymous with the child's, but 
rather each has specific dichotomous rights explicitly assigned 
by Congress. He examines several provisions, such as the right 
to dismiss an IEP team member90 and the right to 
reimbursement, 91 which all grant rights to parents that would 
be absurd if granted to children in an attempt to discredit the 
majority's stance. 92 Additionally, certain procedural guarantees 
allow parents to participate in the challenging IEPs, but does 
not grant parents any rights in that education.93 The dissent 
attempts to rebut the argument that allowing attorney's fees 
only if parents can show an inadequate fre0 appropriate public 
education says nothing about that underlying right, but merely 
what must be shown to vindicate the parent's right.94 Finally, 
the dissent ends with its own policy argument contending that, 
under IDEA, parents are provided with the same option that 
parents are usually afforded: namely, the right to sue in federal 
court with a lawyer. 95 The dissent points out the ills that may 
arise from allowing a greater number of pro se cases in federal 
courts, such as an influx of frivolous cases in federal district 
courts. 96 Without specific language in the statute, the dissent 
refuses to infer any congressional intent to allow non-lawyer 
parents to challenge the quality of education their children are 
receiving under IDEA.97 
Winkelman seems to be a case that was decided 
predominantly on policy concerns rather than strict legal 
reasoning. The argument for both sides hinges on whether 
parents are "parties aggrieved," as used in IDEA.98 The 
majority grasps for various provisions in the statute to bolster 
the argument that Congress intended to provide parents the 
89. ld. 
90. 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(C)(i)·(iii)(2004). 
91. Id. § 1412(a)(lO)(C)(ii). 
92. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 541 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93. ld. at 539. 
94. Id. at 541-42. 
95. ld. at 542. 
96. Id. at 542-43. 
97. Id. at 538. 
98. 20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(2)(A)(2004). 
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right to challenge the substantive education plan for their 
child. However, never do they present a provision that 
definitively silences the debate. The decision could have come 
to the same result with greater effect by merely accepting that 
parents and children must share the same substantive rights 
to allow the structure of IDEA to function properly and that 
parents' interest in their children receiving a free appropriate 
public education is enough to warrant parents to have the right 
to pursue this end without legal representation. 
The substantive function of law is to promote changes that 
solve the issue in which the law was intended to address. Given 
the salience of misdiagnosis of appropriate educational services 
for students with special needs, 99 it is imperative that parents 
are empowered with substantive rights that will allow them to 
ensure their child receives an appropriate education. 
There can be little doubt that Congress provided these 
various procedural rights to parents for any reason other than 
to ensure parents could demand that their disabled child had 
access to a free appropriate public education. Congress 
recognized the inability of disabled students to serve as 
advocates for themselves and challenge the quality of their 
education on their own, and thus provided a system which 
appoints a representative for the child when parents are 
unavailable. 100 To this end, Congress provided parents with the 
means to serve as effective advocates throughout the entire 
procedural process contemplated by IDEA, not just select 
stages. 
There would be a disconnect if parents are intended to have 
every tool available to vigorously defend their child's rights, but 
then be foreclosed the opportunity to defend those rights in 
court. The strongest argument for the majority is the absurdity 
that would result from parents being able to challenge for 
procedural violations, but not be able to obtain judicial review 
of what is the central concern of the parents, namely, the 
quality of their child's education. What parent is actually 
concerned with whether they were provided the opportunity to 
review all of the relevant documents as long as their disabled 
child is receiving the best education available? It is illogical to 
99. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Weiner, Discrimination in Our Public Schools: 
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to an Inadequate Special Education Services for 
Minority Children. 36 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L. REV. 407 (2001). 
100. !d.§ 1415(b)(2). 
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allow parents to recover tuition costs and attorney's fees, but 
then limit that recovery to prevailing on a cause of action not 
their own and one the parents cannot litigate without a lawyer. 
A telling part of IDEA is the provision that classifies 
parents as "parties aggrieved" for administrative hearings. 101 
Apparently, the only logical progression would use the same 
definition later when discussing judicial review. Congress 
obviously intended to give parents substantive rights and to 
include them as a "party aggrieved," otherwise they would have 
only named the child as having the right to bring an action in 
federal district court. The majority is correct in that the 
procedural and substantive rights are so intertwined that they 
rely on each other to ensure the legislative intent of the Act, 
which is to guarantee that every disabled student gets a free 
appropriate public education. The parents' rights and the 
child's rights are synonymous; their use is merely apportioned 
to the parent or child in a way that allows IDEA to function by 
providing them to the party most able to exercise that function. 
The majority could have greatly simplified their decision 
merely by announcing that parents also have an enforceable 
right to their children receiving a free appropriate public 
education. Parents already possess a constitutional right to 
control the education of their children. 102 Therefore, it is a 
short leap from that proposition to giving parents the right to 
ensure that their children receive a free appropriate public 
education. In a sense, this right is a necessary corollary to the 
right to control a child's education. Control implicates the 
ability to ensure that education occurs in an appropriate 
manner. The drafters of IDEA envisioned this, as evidenced by 
the substantial amount of statutory language that is designed 
to give parents the tools to ensure their children receive a 
quality education. Neither side of the debate disputes the 
notion that parents have an interest in their children receiving 
a free appropriate public education, which is an interest more 
than strong enough to create a right to sue under IDEA. The 
profound benefits that accrue to parents from their child 
receiving a free appropriate public education, such as a lesser 
likelihood that parents will have to continuously support their 
child later in life, is well-established in the special education 
101. !d.§ 1415(g)(l). 
102. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
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literature. 103 In fact, individuals have been allowed to bring 
suit for far less important interests. Therefore, it seems 
unnecessary to entangle the parents' and child's rights because 
the parents have such a strong interest on which to support 
judicial review. 
IDEA has the goal to provide disabled children throughout 
the country access to a free appropriate public education, as a 
substantive, and not symbolic, right. A free appropriate public 
education implies that Congress intended it to be provided 
regardless of whether the family has the ability to pay for the 
education. Failure to provide parents full access to the judicial 
review process, simply because they lack the financial means to 
hire a lawyer, directly contradicts the purpose of the law, which 
seeks to ensure that every child in America has access to a 
quality education. Although, it is likely that the Winkelman 
decision will increase the number of frivolous lawsuits, the 
benefits of ensuring that every parent of a child with a 
disability has an enforceable right to their child receiving a free 
appropriate education, far exceeds the costs of increased 
litigation. 
Justice Scalia's proposed regime would run counter to this 
purpose. The ability to pay for representation would define 
which families could challenge the quality of the education 
provided to their disabled child. The families at the bottom of 
the socio-economic scale with disabled children are the families 
that likely are unable to afford expensive private school tuition 
or attend well-funded schools in affluent districts. These are 
the families that have the greatest need for the public 
education envisioned by IDEA. These are the families IDEA 
was designed to protect. This is evidenced by a recent report 
from the U.S. Department of Education, which found that two-
thirds (approximately 4.5 million) of children with disabilities 
come from families who earn less than $50,000 per year. 104 
Additionally, over two million children with disabilities live in 
households that earn less than $25,000 annually. 105 Therefore, 
prior to the Winkelman decision it is likely that many parents 
103. Marlene Simon, Beyond Broken Promises: Reflections on Eliminating Barriers 
to the Success of Minority Youth with Disabilities, The Journal of the Association for 
Persons with Severe Handicaps, 26 (3) (2001). 
104. The Scales Tip in Favor of Parents in Winkelman v. Parma City School 
District, 28 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDJCIAHY 277, 313·14 (2008). 
105. !d. at 313. 
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of children with disabilities were unable to advocate for their 
child's right to a free appropriate public education through the 
legal system because they did not have the monetary resources 
to obtain legal representation. The ability of parents to ensure 
the quality of their child's education should not be dependent 
upon their ability to afford legal representation. According to a 
study conducted by the Council of Parent Attorneys and 
Advocates, legal representation for special education claims 
can range anywhere from $10,000 to $100.000, which far 
beyond what the majority of special education households are 
able to pay. 106 
Despite the laudable goals of IDEA to improve the quality 
of special education, legal cases such as Winkelman illuminate 
the inability of many parents to serve as advocates for their 
child's education due to their inability to pay for legal 
representation. The underlying principle of IDEA is the notion 
that all students should be afforded the opportunity to excel 
academically through high quality instruction. 107 For various 
reasons, such as low expectations or exclusion from the general 
classroom, children with disabilities often do not receive access 
to the same quality of education as general education students. 
Furthermore, children with disabilities are arguably the most 
vulnerable student population because they are often unable to 
communicate their educational experiences to parents and 
teachers. Therefore, it is imperative that parents of children 
with disabilities have meaningful opportunities to both 
participate in and evaluate the education of their child. 
Although some may argue that non-lawyer parents of children 
with disabilities are not qualified to represent their child in 
court pro se, special education parents are often the most well-
versed on their child's education needs because they typically 
are the primary caregiver. Furthermore, it is better for children 
with special needs to have a parental advocate as opposed to 
having no representation at all. 
106. The Couneil of Parent Attorneys and Advocates is a non-profit organization 
that seeks to provide special education law resources and training for parents, 
attorneys, and special education advocates (citing to Brief for Council of Parent 
Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. et a!., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-10, 
n.4, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007)). 
107. McNEAL & O'ROURKE, supra note 17, at 31-62. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in 
promoting social justice within America's schools, as 
researchers, educators, and policymakers struggle to provide 
all students with a high quality education. Social justice may 
be defined as "an ideal condition in which all members of a 
society have the same basic rights, protection, opportunities, 
obligations, and social benefits." 108 The Supreme Court ruling 
in Winkelman v. Parma City School District will help promote 
social justice in America's schools by empowering parents of 
students with disabilities with substantive rights to appear pro 
se in federal court to challenge the appropriateness of their 
child's IEP. As the special education landscape continues to 
shift its focus from access to quality, commendable decisions 
such as Winkelman v. Parma City School District will continue 
to ensure that all disabled students receive a quality education, 
regardless of their race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The 
alternative-excluding parents from full participation in their 
child's education process-would directly contradict the spirit 
of special education law, which seeks to guarantee educational 
excellence for all. The Winkelman decision suggests that the 
current judicial terrain supports this notion of strengthening 
the substantive role and responsibility of special education 
parents in the educational lives of their children both today 
and in the years to come. Ultimately, Winkelman will help 
transform IDEA into more substantive, robust education 
reform through increased teacher and school leader 
accountability for the quality of education provided to children 
with disabilities. 
108. ROB8RT L. BARKF:R, SOCIAL WORK DICTIONARY, (5th ed. 2003), s.v. Social 
Justice. 
